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ABSTRACT
Several federal energy programs aim to "commercialize" new energy tech-
nologies, i.e., to bring them from research to the market. Product standards
and warranties are sometimes a part of these programs. Yet the benefits
which the standards and warranties are to achieve are rarely articulated, and
how these benefits will be achieved is often even less clear.
This article takes the view that the substantive goals of standards and
warranties can be articulated. It examines the functions of standards and
warranties and the processes which produce them, and casts their effects
in terms of impacts upon the new technology's demand, supply and industrial
market structure. The relevance of these impacts upon commercialization
programs is then discussed, covering the role of standards in the new in-
dustry's development, the need for standards and warranties in demonstration
projects and in the private financing of new energy systems, and mechanisms
for development of standards and warranties. The need for basic research
on standards and warranties is then addressed.
STANDARDS, WARRANTIES AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF NEW ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES*
I. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of a new product into the marketplace requires
adjustments and raises concern, or at least questions, about the new
product. Its proper and safe use must be explained to consumers. How it
meshes with related products must be understood. The reliability and
safety of the product must satisfy the customer, preferably in advance of
sale. Information concerning the product such as size, rating, and
operational characteristics must be presented to the potential consumer
to allow him to evaluate the product and compare it with others.
Responsibility for the product's failure to meet expectations must be
established.
Product standards and warranties help to regulate the interactions
among buyers, sellers, manufacturers, and repairers concerning the vast
array of products in our society. By addressing the concerns raised
above, they flesh out many aspects of marketplace transactions. Such
transactions, being far more than mere exchanges of "goods for bucks,"
involve questions of the product's usefulness: whether the product will
perform a certain function, whether it will operate in conjunction with
another piece of equipment, etc. It is not merely from ownership of the
good that the consumer derives benefit; rather it is from the uses to
which the good may be put. Standards and warranties help to indicate
what those uses are and how adequately a given product fits them.
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Historically, articulation of standards and warranties so that they
achieve these purposes has occurred mostly through voluntary private
procedures. Once a product had become established and experience with
its use had accrued, the needs which standards and warranties could
fulfill became clearer, and groups such as trade associations would from
time to time respond to such needs. More recently, various consumer and
regulatory groups have begun to recognize the usefulness of standards and
warranties for shaping the workings of the marketplace; mandatory use of
standards and warranties for policy purposes has risen.
Nevertheless, while development of standards and warranties has
proceeded when the need has been generally recognized, planning to
achieve identified substantive goals has not been emphasized. Rather,
the emphasis has been on the process by which the standards are reached;
if the process is voluntary and open, then the results are considered
satisfactory. The validity of this process has come into question
recently, and so have the resulting standards and warranties.
The need to determine whether a standard or warranty is "good" or
not increases with the importance of the benefits which the standards and
warranties can bring. The current "energy crisis" has raised this
importance because of efforts to "commercialize" several new energy
technologies. (Commercialization is the process by which a governmental
agency assists a technology's progress from research all the way through
introduction of the product into the marketplace.) Many of these
commercialization efforts call for development of standards, warranties,
or both in furtherance of their goals. Yet by and large these efforts
rely upon the voluntary process not merely to produce the standards and
warranties but also to legitimize them. In essence, the resulting
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standards and warranties are judged by the process which produces them
and not by their substance.
Whatever the validity of the process model for established
technologies, differences for technologies undergoing the process of
commercialization cast doubt upon process as the sole source of
legitimacy. The technologies involved are undergoing technological
change, in some cases rapid; the effects of standards and warranties upon
the rate and direction of technological change must be considered. That
no market or only a very limited one exists for these technologies
indicates that little user experience exists upon which to draw for
formulating the standards and warranties. And the accelerated nature of
the development efforts may yield further complications for information
flow.
It is argued herein that the use of standards and warranties in the
commercialization of new energy technologies can proceed on a planning
basis instead of merely relying upon process, i.e. that purposes for
standards and warranties can be established and strategies for achieving
them detailed instead of allowing the process to determine the standards
and warranties. Furthermore, this planning basis can best be understood
by examining the market functions of standards and warranties and the
developing market context in which the standards and warranties will
operate; from examining this conjunction of possible effects with desired
ones, intelligent plans can be developed. While the market context
surrounding any particular new energy technology is not explored below,
some generic problems of commercialization efforts are examined. The
analysis begins with an examination of how standards and warranties
function in markets.
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II. THE OPERATION OF STANDARDS AND WARRANTIES
Standards and warranties each serve several distinct functions in
markets. Moreover, each serves some functions which the other does not,
even though they are closely related. Furthermore, the processes
involved in the creation and operation of each are different. These
various functions and processes, the understanding of which is essential
to analysis of the issues, are discussed below.
A. STANDARDS
For the uninitiated, a few examples of standards may help.
Measurement of time (hours, days, years, etc.) is the classic (one is
tempted to say "standard") example of standards; without agreement on
these units, the entire operation of today's world might grind to a
halt. Size (inches, meters) and weight (grams, tons) are other examples
of standards in commmon use. Standards for uniformity such as those for
nuts and bolts constitute another type of standards. Safety standards
such as those for the flammability of children's sleepwear are one
example of quality standards.
While standards are not susceptible of precise definition, they seem
to be fully described by their two basic attributes: the information
they provide to their users and the agreements they represent among some
or all users. For example, size classification standards for tires
provide the following information and more: they tell consumers the
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number and variety of tire sizes offered in the marketplace, they inform
producers what sizes to produce (and what sizes other producers are
producing), and they inform consumers that a tire of a particular
classification can be used to replace another tire of the same
classification, regardless of the manufacturer. Similarly, they
represent at least the following agreements: that manufacturers will all
limit size variety the same way, that the classifications established
suit all major users of the tire (e.g., commercial vs. pleasure driving),
and how tire manufacturers and automobile wheel manufacturers will
coordinate so that tires will mesh with wheels.
In addition to "defining" standards as both containing information
and representing an agreement, standards can be described in at least two
different ways: function and process of development. Each is discussed
in turn.
1. Function
Standards can perform many different functions. These functions
include establishment of product uniformity, compatibility, product
quality, and test and measurement methods.
Product uniformity can be established through standards. Here it is
defined as one product's being identical to another of the same type in
certain designated aspects such as size and weight. Writing tablets, for
example, come in only a few basic sizes and line widths. By making
products uniform, the range of variety (and its associated inventory and
distribution costs) required for doing business falls; this decline in
variety encourages economies of scale. For example, standardized window
and door sizes greatly simplify construction of new housing. Also,
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product characteristics are better defined, and consumers are more likely
to absorb information concerning the product when a reduction in variety
simplifies the consumer's choice.
Related to the uniformity function is compatibility; standards can
be established which ensure that, for example, a solar device is
compatible with other components necessary to complete the system or with
devices of another manufacturer. Compatibility often follows from
uniformity (a good example is bricks which must be compatible with
themselves), but it adds another aspect in that it insures that the
product fits with related products. Nuts and bolts are the classic
example; while each can be made uniform, they are worthless unless they
are compatible with one another. Because compatibility standards permit
the use of interchangeable parts, they are often referred to as
interchangeability standards. Interchangeability of, say, one nut for
another necessarily results from nuts and bolts designed to fit one
another; the principal point is that they fit, however, and not that one
nut can be substituted for another.
Quality levels can be established using standards; lifetime of a
solar system might be one example. Quality can be established implicitly
by uniformity and compatibility standards; one example is a 2 x 4 piece
of lumber, which in addition to being a standard size (1-5/8" x 3-5/8")
has known and specified structural characteristics. Also, quality
standards perform some of the risk-allocation functions of warranties
(see below) in that they determine what level of prevention of accidents
(in, e.g., a safety context) the manufacturer will build into the
product, the costs being borne by all consumers of the product. Auto
safety standards are an obvious example.
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Finally, test methods for agreeing upon lifetime or reliability (for
example) can be established using standards. The importance of test
methods cannot be underestimated; through these, compliance with all
other standards is verified. The test method may vary from a simple
measurement (using a standardized yardstick) to a complex test involving
a determination of whether a solar heat collector filled with its working
fluid will stagnate and fail if pumps are inoperative for 30 days.
2. Process
Standards can also be described by the process used to develop
them. Different processes representing different levels of public
involvement distinguish the various processes. They range from company
standards which reflect no public involvement to industry standards, full
consensus standards, and finally mandatory standards, the last being
backed by the full force of law. Differences in the reasons why
producers, consumers, and regulators might want to participate at any
level in the standardization process influence the development of policy
for using standards in commercialization.
At the lowest level of public involvement is the company standard,
applicable only to the goods of one firm. The standard is very likely
internal to the company, applying only to the company's assembly line to
ensure interchangeability of parts during assembly and thus being
invisible to the marketplace. Such standards function essentially as
management tools for the individual firm, and as such are beyond the
reach of wise policy.
When the need for intercompany, or industry, standards arises, trade
or technical associations often develop standards. These standards often
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free the industry from dependence upon individual suppliers of parts.
Such was the case for the young automotive industry, which standardized
screw and bolt sizes, steel composition, wheel and rim sizes, and spark
plugs, among many others.l Participation by the companies affected,
and usually in relation to the products purchased from other industries,
characterize industry standards.
The private standard employing the widest participation is the full
voluntary consensus standard, developed under the auspices of one of the
private standards organizations such as the American Society for Testing
and Materials. Often the content is similar to that of industry
standards, but the process of arriving at the standard differs. While
procedures vary from organization to organization, several common aspects
emerge. After establishing the need for standards in a particular area,
participation is invited (with varying degrees of inclusiveness) and
committees begin drafting the standards. After completion of committee
work the standards are approved or rejected by the organization as a
whole. Despite the term "consensus," unanimity is not usually required,
nor are all groups necessarily represented. Also, use is voluntary; no
sanctions (other than "market sanctions" which might follow from being
out of step with others) result from failure to follow the standards
agreed upon.
Somewhat different in terms of participation are standards mandated
by federal or state law. Mandatory standards, while possibly identical
in content to voluntary ones, differ in their operation; additional legal
rights and duties often exist and governmental agencies may have a right
to intervene or dispense justice in cases of dispute. In many ways
mandatory standards are less flexible than other standards; their use is
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best justified when standards would not be forthcoming from private
sources, e.g., when large numbers of consumers find reaching agreement or
even initiating action too difficult.
B. WARRANTIES
Warranties form part of the contract between buyer and seller. As
such they are legal creatures, governed by contract law. Yet they
perform economic functions as well. While many of the functions are
similar to those of standards, especially in the case of industry-wide
warranties, a few functions are special to warranties.
1. Function
Warranties function primarily by reference to standards, thus making
the standards part of the contract. For example, a contract for the sale
of tires of a specified size (F70-14) incorporates the standards
describing that tire into the contract; the description of the tire
becomes a warranty that the tires will conform to the description. This
is the predominant, if somewhat mundane, function of warranties: to make
the terms of contracts more certain.
The standard referred to in the contract may be specific to that
contract (i.e., created by the contract) or may apply to all sales in
that industry. Through the device of reference, any of the functions of
standards can obtain if the warranties are industry-wide. Returning to
the example, if all contracts for sale of tires refer to the sizes
specified in the tire standards, then the simplification of variety
contemplated by the standardization scheme is achieved.
-9-
But warranties perform further functions, functions of greater
interest here. Most important of these functions are: 1) insurance, or
spreading the risk of product failure among buyers; 2) distributing the
risk between buyers and sellers; and 3) improving the quality of
information. Each is discussed in turn.
Warranties can serve as a form of insurance, spreading the cost of
various possible mishaps among all consumers of the product. They
achieve this result in the following way. For a given volume of sales
there exists a mishap cost, i.e., a percentage of units which will fail
in some way and require repairs, thus incurring cost. While the
incidence of this cost will vary from one consumer to another, the total
of these costs is likely to be a relatively constant fraction of total
sales revenues if many units are sold. A warranty places this cost
burden upon the manufacturer. The manufacturer, in order to stay in
business, will raise the price of each unit sold under warranty by the
average mishap cost per unit. This increase in price over the price of
an unwarrantied unit represents the insurance "premium" paid by the
consumers to protect them against above-average mishap costs.
For example, suppose that a solar system with a five-year warranty
covering system failure costs 10% more than a solar system without any
warranty. The 10% increase in price is paid by all consumers and
protects them from the cost of a breakdown in the system. Consumers of
unwarrantied systems will average out to paying the same 10%, but the
loss is spread unevenly; if failure is total when it occurs, nine out of
ten will face no loss while one out of ten will face total loss over the
five-year period. Facing the risks this way (without warranties) is
self-insurance; its desirability will depend upon the cost of the
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warranty and the cost of the consumer's own actions to avoid mishaps.
Also, warranties distribute the risk for preventing failures between
the seller and buyer. For example, a warranty against an instrument's
failure in an environment of 100% humidity will cost the buyer more than
a warranty against failure at lower humidity, but it saves him the cost
of dehumidifying the operating environment. The rational buyer, in order
to lower the total cost of purchasing and using the product, will demand
a warranty which will minimize the sum of production, warranty, and
failure avoidance costs. Either party can prevent the accident
(instrument failure at high humidity); the warranty determines who faces
the burden of failure and encourages that party to take appropriate
action. If the warranty against failure at 100% humidity is chosen, the
manufacturer will redesign the product to minimize production and
warranty costs; if the weaker warranty is chosen, the buyer will face
lower product and warranty costs and will take steps to dehumidify the
instrument room. Warranties can be used to allocate responsibility of
action to the party which can avoid the accident at the least cost, thus
minimizing the total social cost of producing and using the product.
(Quality standards can be made to operate similarly, by setting the
quality level such that further improvements in quality are cheaper for
the buyer/user to provide than for the seller/manufacturer.)
Finally, warranties can be used to help assure the quality of
information. Acquisition of information has a cost, and it is often
easier for, say, an auto manufacturer to provide the information on the
safety of the brakes and the engine through a warranty than for the
consumer to develop that information through special testing. The
warranty helps to assure the information regarding the auto's safety by
making the seller responsible for the warranty's truthfulness.
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2. Process
Warranties fall into three basic types: express warranties,
warranties of merchantability, and warranties of fitness for a particular
purpose. An example of the first type is given in the preceding
section: an express statement which forms part of the agreement and
concerns the product's quality results is an express warranty, and its
breach gives the buyer legal remedies. This is the familiar form of
warranty, enforced ultimately by state courts of general jurisdiction.
Deceptiveness in express warranties is also governed by the Magnuson-Moss
Act which empowers the Federal Trade Commission to regulate warranty
practices.
The other two types of warranties are called implied warranties
because they are not explicit but rather arise from the context of the
transaction and the market environment; in short, they are implied from
the facts surrounding the contract. Both form a backstop to the extent
to which caveat emptor is followed by courts. While relevant to the
problem of warranties in general, they are important here only to show
the "baseline" warranties without express warranties.
C. EFFECTS OF STANDARDS AND WARRANTIES
Standards and warranties can affect the market for the product they
cover in any of three principal ways. They can affect the cost of the
goods supplied, they can affect the demand for the goods, or they can
alter the competitive structure of the market. A single standard or
warranty is also likely to have multiple effects. For example, a
standard which effectively bans all but quality products when quality is
difficult for the consumer to determine has the effect of elevating the
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average quality in the marketplace, thus increasing demand (shifting the
demand curve outward) by reducing the likelihood of purchasing a
"lemon." But it also is likely to raise prices, thus reducing
consumption (moving up the demand curve), and to exclude certain firms
from the market, thus limiting competition. All the various effects
which might result must be weighed before any intelligent judgment
concerning the desirability of a standard or warranty can be made.
The potential of each type of effect for a developing technology is
discussed below, with possible pitfalls.
1. Effects Upon Demand
Standards and warranties have the potential for expanding demand for
a new product in several different ways. They can provide quality
assurances to prospective buyers, they can provide other product
information to buyers, and they can ensure that the product is compatible
with related equipment. Each possible route to increased demand is
explored below.
Quality assurance. Standards and warranties can assure a product's
prospective purchaser of the product's quality in one of two ways: they
can raise the average quality of the goods available in the marketplace
or they can increase the buyer's certainty that the goods purchased are
of a predictable (to the buyer) quality.
In the first case, demand increases because goods of inferior
quality, which are in many instances indistinguishable from goods of
higher quality, vanish from the marketplace; with assurances to the
consumer of minimum quality, the item for sale thus appears more
attractive. Minimum quality levels can be established by either mandated
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standards or warranties or can be reached through the usual voluntary
process. In situations in which the industry demand would increase if
goods of lower quality were excluded, industry associations have an
incentive to establish minimum standards and warranties and governmental
intervention might not be necessary.
Similarly, grading of products (e.g. grade A eggs, choice beef) can
assure the prospective purchaser that the particular item selected for
purchase more closely approaches a given quality, thus narrowing the
range of uncertainty facing the purchaser and reducing the cost of
obtaining information concerning the product's quality. Minimum quality
standards and related warranties will also do this, though grading is a
sharper instrument.
These are the only two ways standards and warranties can increase
the quality of goods in the marketplace. They cannot make an inferior
good superior. The best they can do is to focus manufacturers upon
particular quality levels, thus directing all productive resources toward
producing items of minimum or graded quality. Further, this additional
quality comes at a cost, since superior goods cost more than inferior
ones. Additionally, by excluding goods below a minimum quality or
confining consumer choices to specified grades, the variety of products
available to the purchaser narrows, thus reducing demand somewhat. These
negative concerns must be balanced against the benefits which might flow
from using standards and warranties for quality assurance.
Warranties can also function apart from the related standards to
reduce the variation of quality which the buyer receives. By warranting
against certain types of failures, the buyer has some assurance that he
will be reimbursed for deviations from expected quality, thus increasing
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the buyer's confidence that he is getting what he wants. This use of
warranties becomes much like any insurance policy against failure, and
the cost of this policy must be paid up front, thereby increasing the
initial cost. This increase in cost to gain an increase in demand does
not necessarily result in a standoff, however. If buyers are averse to
bearing risks regarding quality, the insurance function of warranties
will produce a net increase in demand. Increased warranty coverage will
not always result in increased demand, however. Some failures are easier
(less costly) for the user to avoid or repair than for the manufacturer;
a full-coverage lifetime warranty would require manufacturers to cover
these failures, thus raising costs in the long run. (See discussion of
allocating risk between seller and buyer above.)
Providing product information. Standards establish the yardsticks
by which many product attributes other than quality (such as weight,
size, and color) can be described. These "yardstick" standards differ
from quality standards in that they describe rather than prescribe;
better or worse is not at stake. They are needed to implement any
quality standards or warranties. The yardstick standards can be used to
provide to prospective purchasers much information needed for comparing
different products.
The obvious basic information needed for solar products will be
items such as voltage, peak power, size, weight, etc. Development of
test methods and measurement techniques is essential. But some
evaluative bits of information will also prove quite useful. Because
many factors affect the value of a solar system to a prospective user
(e.g. insolation, system efficiency, cost of an alternative source of
power such as the utility, and cost of storage), simply presenting the
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information may be of limited usefulness. Some standardized method of
translating these factors into value to the consumer would provide
additional product information.
Compatibility. To be useful, solar equipment must be compatible
with related system equipment, and the systems which result must be
compatible with the electric utility grid for grid-connected
applications. Standards which establish this compatibility will permit
the demand for new energy technologies to expand by insuring that an
interface with complementary technologies will exist. One expects that
manufacturers will work to achieve this compatibility because it will
expand the demand for their product.
2. Effects Upon Cost
Both standards and warranties can affect the cost of products.
Standards can be used to affect both the costs of production and the rate
and direction of technological change for the product; warranties can
distribute the total social costs of using and maintaining a product
between buyer and seller so as to minimize those costs. Each effect upon
cost is discussed in turn.
Production costs and technological change. Standards can affect the
cost of products in several ways. Assuming no technological change,
company standards can facilitate the use of assembly lines. Having a set
of established sizes for a product (such as lumber) can reduce inventory
needs by reducing the variety of products requiring storage and can allow
greater economies of scale for the fewer items in production. These uses
of standards are important and are considered to be the major benefit of
standards by some; their pursuit was the focus of standardization
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activities in the 1920's under the direction of then Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover.2
But the interaction between standards and technological change
proves the most interesting for new energy technologies, because most
cost reduction expected for the technologies will come from technological
change. While ordinarily standards are developed for technologies
already established, many new technologies are under development, and the
possibility of effects of standards upon technological change in these
technologies becomes important.
Several types of effects which might follow from the interaction
between standards and technological change are of concern here. Some
notion of the proper timing of standards in the technology development
process is important; the differences between the consequences of early
versus late standards development may be critical. Also, ways in which
standards might affect the rate and depth of technological change should
be addressed. Finally, the effects of the two possible types of errors
(developing standards when unneeded vs. not developing standards when
needed) must be compared.
Despite the complexities of the process of technological change 3,
two basic insights will highlight the major interactions between
standards and technological change. First, because the process of
technological change for any product is fraught with multiple
uncertainties, some staging of the process is necessary to keep costs in
line and the research manageable. Breaking the process down into the
stages of research, development, introduction, and diffusion,4 one can
see that the need for information and consensus varies as the technology
moves from research to diffusion.
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Table I summarizes these differences. The key point to be drawn
from it is that only some standards need to be developed at any given
stage of a product's development. As the details of the technology
become clearer, standards can become more rigid without interfering
unduly with subsequent technological change.
A second insight is that experience with one technological option
will result in learning effects which will reduce the cost of that
option, thus making it comparatively cheaper than other options. This
may be called the bias of experience and has some implications for
standards development for a technology such as photovoltaics which is
undergoing rapid technological change.
If one distinguishes between learning-by-doing5 on the one hand
and discrete technological change (which requires reorientation of
productive activities) on the other, one can see that standardization of
a product will essentially block out the possibility of discrete
technological change while permitting all production efforts to focus
upon learning activities. So, ideally, standards should be developed
when the likelihood and possible benefits of further discrete
technological change is low compared to the opportunities for learning
effects to accrue.
Ideal timing is, however, unlikely. But the errors which flow from
being early or late are not the same. While the magnitudes of these
errors cannot be measured with any certainty, they can be compared
qualitatively. If standards development occurs while opportunities for
discrete technological change are high, technological options with great
long-run potential may be excluded; the standardized option accrues
learning effects, thus making it increasingly favorable when compared to
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TABLE I
ROLE OF STANDARDS IN THE VARIOUS STAGES OF TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
STAGE APPROPRIATE INAPPROPRIATE
OF STANDARDIZATION STANDARDIZATION
DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES ACTIVITIES
RESEARCH Only the most elemental Detailed technology or
terminology measurement procedures
Any product standards
DEVELOPMENT Terminology Fixed product standards
Measurement and test Product grade and quality
procedures standards
Late in stage,
production technology
characteristics
INTRODUCTION Obvious interchange- Detailed interchange-
ability standards ability standards
Preliminary grade and Full product standards
quality standards
DIFFUSION Full product standards Standards which lock out
future advances
Standards which
detrimentally affect
non-technolog ical concerns
such as market structure and
consumer welfare.
SOURCE: Bottaro (2)
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undeveloped options. Such an error can produce a permanent change in the
opportunities for long-term cost reduction by closing out an option which
might achieve greater long-run cost reduction. But if standards
development occurs late, the main consequence (as far as technological
chaioe is concerned) would be a delay or postponement of learning effects
for the ultimately dominant design. The starting date for accruing
learning effects is postponed, but the risks of errant selection of the
dominant design are reduced, thus reducing the risk of delaying
technological change or placing an artificial ceiling on the extent of
technological change obtainable. So when the matter of timing is in
doubt, erring on the late side is preferable from considerations of
technological change. (Other considerations discussed elsewhere must, of
course, be balanced.)
Given that many discrete options are still being considered for many
new energy technologies, delay in standards development may be warranted
here. Because of the relative costs of error, standards development for
new energy technologies should probably await some settling down of the
technologies before full product standards are developed. However,
standards covering terminology and test procedures would help develop and
exchange information.
Total social cost. Warranties can reduce the total social cost of
using and maintaining a product. They can achieve this result because of
differences in the situations of the consumer and producer.
The consumer and producer of a product have access to different
information concerning the product and its use and face different costs
of action for modifying the product or affecting its use. The producer
knows more about the product's design and operation, how to install it
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and maintain it and, in many cases, how the product is likely to fail and
how to fix it. It is easier for the producer to modify the product's
design and to make many types of repairs on the product. The consumer,
on the other hand, knows more about the product's actual use and
installation, what types of failures are common to that use, and what
actually happened when a failure did occur. It is easier for the
consumer to undertake day-to-day preventive maintenance of the product
according to the producer's instructions and to customize the product for
the special use of the consumer.
Warranties can take advantages of these differences to minimize
total social costs; the following example, by no means exhaustive, shows
how this might occur.
Warranties can place the burden upon the producer for losses
resulting from design and manufacturing flaws while leaving
responsibility upon the consumer for losses flowing from improper use and
installation. They can place the burden upon the producer for repairs of
properly maintained systems while releasing the producer from liability
when the consumer has not adhered to maintenance procedures. And they
can, by expiring after a specified period of time, protect producers from
responsibility for mishaps occurring many years after sale, mishaps
occurring after many events which only the consumer knows of and can
control have transpired.
Using warranties in this way can minimize the aggregate of producer
and consumer costs incurred through production and use of the product.
Since producer costs are ultimately born by the consumer, warranties can
be used to lower the total costs which consumers must ultimately bear.
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3. Effects Upon Market Structure
Standards can have effects upon the competitive nature of the
standardized product's industry. While in some cases standards only
reinforce the existing industrial behavior by making a competitive
industry more competitive (by facilitating the flow of information) and
an uncompetitive industry less so (by facilitating collusion), they can
also counter existing circumstances; they do not necessarily mirror
market conditions. Product standardization can reduce product
differentiation, thus allowing smaller and new competitors to compete
more effectively. Similarly, it might reduce the effects of brand names,
thus lowering barriers to entry into the industry. If product
standardization results in increased interchangeability of products of
diverse manufacturers, markets for the product will widen as sellers'
capture of particular submarkets weakens; further lowering of barriers to
entry may result. The effects are not all positive; the economies of
scale derived from variety reduction and other effects of standards may
result in larger and fewer plants; the high capital cost of a larger
plant may become a barrier to entry, especially for smaller firms.
Furthermore, standardization by its very nature facilitates coordination
among the suppliers of a product; such coordination might result in
monopolistic activities such as price-fixing and could result in legal
(anti-trust) problems.
Since the effects of standards upon market structure and competition
are unclear, it is hard to evaluate how they should be taken into account
for new energy technologies at present. A key factor influencing the
effects a given set of standards has upon an industry producing new
energy products is the industry's behavior, which is changing as rapidly
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as the industry is growing. The matter is clearly of concern and merits
attention over time. Since anticipating anticompetitive effects is
difficult, the role of standards may be limited to after-the-fact aid.
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III. COMMERCIALIZATION PROGRAMS AND STANDARDS AND WARRANTIES
During the course of a commercialization program the product and
production technology are undergoing technological change. Selection of
a "dominant design" occurs late in the program, if ever. Throughout the
program's duration information is being gathered. Demonstration projects
are one key element for gathering information concerning the operation of
various systems and components; there is also pressure to use the
demonstrations to "prime the market," i.e. to kindle an interest in the
product. Since many solar technologies have high capital costs, concern
about the availability of financing for the systems arises. The need to
protect consumers from shoddy merchandise is also raised. Since
standards and warranties are often invoked to address these concerns, the
mechanisms by which they are created are of interest.
This section applies the background of section II to four specific
issues which often arise during the course of a commercialization
effort: 1) the role of standards in the development of new energy
technology industries; 2) the need for standards and warranties for
demonstration projects; 3) the need for standards and warranties for
financing new energy technology systems; and 4) mechanisms for developing
standards and warranties. Finally, the need for basic research
concerning standards and warranties is addressed.
For the purposes of examining the standards and warranties, it is
assumed that efforts to produce them have succeeded, i.e. that standards
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are being complied with and warranties followed. If not, then efforts to
produce them are failures of a rather obvious kind; it is only when the
efforts succeed that the analysis becomes interesting. So, in effect,
the analysis treats the standards and warranties as if they were
mandatory by assuming compliance.
A. STANDARDS AND NEW ENERGY TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT
One key concern of most demonstration programs is the development of
a self-sustaining industry to produce and market the product. After the
technology is developed, this embryonic industry will invest in
production equipment and grow large, the product having been successfully
commercialized. The effect of standards development upon this industry's
ability to become established and producing low-cost products is
important, particularly if premature standards development can inhibit
growth or freeze the technology. Standards which affect the technology
or the rate and direction of technological changes are particularly
important here, as they may lead to investment in inappropriate
production equipment or perhaps discourage investment altogether; these
effects upon investment would, or course, slow the industry's long-run
growth.
Section II identified several potential benefits of standards and
warranties in markets. They are summarized below. If these benefits
follow from appropriate standardization activities, industrial growth
will be encouraged.
Demand benefits: elimination of inferior goods, narrowed range
in product quality, insurance against defects, measurement of
product characteristics, and assurance of compatibility of related
components;
-25-
Supply benefits: furthering of learning effects (cost
reduction) with a dominant design, cost reduction through optimal
allocation of responsibility; and
Market structure benefits: furtherance of competitive market
structure.
Two potentially significant counterconsiderations were also
identified:
the cost of increased quality; and
the dangers of locking out technological options with potential for
great cost reduction.
Also identified were the types of standards for which information
would be available at a particular stage in the technology development
process (see Table I above). As the table indicates, the earliest
efforts for standards development should focus on terminology and test
methods, and only when the product has left the research stage. These
first efforts must be accomplished before technically sound standards
pertaining to the later stages of the technology development process can
be developed. Since the information necessary to develop standards of
any greater detail (e.g. for system configurations) is not available
until final development and introduction, full product standards should
await the development of the requisite information; the feasibility and
desirability of such standards should be reassessed with the technology's
progress.
Concern about technological change and its effects upon investment
requires only basic standards and warranties development before the
diffusion stage. Two basic concerns suggest this result. First, the
uncertain nature of the technology development process and the cost of
obtaining information require those involved to break the process into
stages to permit sequential acquisition of technical and market
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information concerning the product under development. At each stage
different amounts and types of information are available, and at
different costs. It is not until the introduction stage that investment
in the technology has reached the point at which the first actual user
experience occurs. Because this user experience is critical to many
aspects of product design, development of standards before this stage is
completed would ignore this experience, and the standards developed would
be favorable to long-range success only by chance.
Second, concern about the bias of experience suggests delaying the
development of full standards if the matter is uncertain, considerations
other than technological change aside. Failure to heed concerns about
the bias of experience and opportunities for discrete technological
change can result in overinvestment in a technology which will never
achieve the low costs of some presently immature, "miracle" technology
which may reach technological maturity later. Several solar programs are
presently experiencing an increase in funding for basic research and
development, thus (by design) increasing the likelihood of discrete
technological change; hence, the risks of standardizing a stock
technology to the exclusion of a presently embryonic but potentially
dominant one are great. And as the markets are still small, postponement
of many of the benefits of standards is not too serious.
Furthermore, aside from considerations of technological change,
delay of standardization activities until the diffusion stage will
produce greater benefits in the long run by allowing knowledgeable
consumer participation to occur. In many cases, the user of a product
has the best (and possibly the only) source of information concerning
details of the product's use. Without this information, intelligent
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choices concerning establishment of relevant sizes, voltages, etc.,
cannot be made, nor can one determine the characteristic problems which
should be addressed by a warranty. Since ultimately it is the consumers
who will determine the industry's success, consumer participation in the
development process for standards and warranties is necessary for
satisfactory results.
Without an active market, user experience is necessarily scant.
Hence the development of many standards and warranties best follows the
existence of a market rather than precedes it. For example, in the case
of photovoltaics, the present market is remote, stand-alone applications;
the experience garnered there is very different from what one might
expect in the grid-connected market expected in the future. Therefore,
putting a hold on the development of full product standards and
warranties for the time being allows for subsequent consumer input to be
effective and prevents the standards and warranties from being developed
solely by technical persons outside a market context. This will help
ensure investment in equipment for producing products with the greatest
chances of long-range success.
However, nothing suggests that the development of basic standards
and product information should be pursued any way but vigorously. It is
suggested only that standards development efforts beyond that point can
wait (from the viewpoint of ultimate cost reduction). The delay in
development of full standards suggested by considerations of
technological change and lack of information will provide a useful
interlude in which to advance our knowledge concerning the solar market
to come and the effects standards and warranties will have on that
market. (See III.E below.)
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B. STANDARDS, WARRANTIES, AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS
Most commercialization efforts include plans for "demonstrations"
of the resulting products, primarily to spread information concerning the
product's desirability. It is thus hoped that demand for the product
will be stimulated. Demonstrations are also done for another less
obvious purpose: to obtain information concerning the product's
operation and field performance and also some feedback from consumers
about the product. While pursuit of this latter purpose is inconsistent
with fully developed standards and warranties, standards and warranties
are often invoked as tools for controlling the quality of the
demonstrations and thus increasing their chances of success.
Concerns that demonstrations be of high quality, thus stimulating
demand rather than stifling it, are well-placed. Some assurance that the
systems placed in the field perform as planned is necessary. But are
standards and warranties the right tools? And, if so, should the
standards and warranties used for demonstration projects be the same ones
which it is hoped will be used industry-wide to produce the benefits
discussed above? In analyzing these questions, two factors should be
considered: the information needed to create standards and warranties
and to be derived from the demonstrations, and the role of standards and
warranties in meeting the concerns surrounding demonstrations.
1. Standards and Warranties and the Information Content of
Demonstrations
The systems used in demonstrations will not represent the final word
in solar technology. On the contrary, a major purpose of the
demonstrations is to gain technical and economic information. This
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information should cover the system's operating experience, the costs of
operating and maintaining the system (and how to reduce those costs),
installation problems and procedures, and the problems and advantages of
particular designs.
Also, the existence of the demonstrations provides the first
widespread user experience with the systems. Upon gaining this
experience, many gaps in information become filled; only at this time
does adequate information for establishment of many aspects of standards
and warranties become available. For example, user needs first become
known, and the failure modes which are most likely to occur and are most
severe (and hence of most concern for warranty development) are
discovered.
One key area of concern is installation procedures. One lesson
learned from the solar heating and cooling (SHAC) experience is that
development of standardized installation procedures suited to the
installer's level of expertise will help insure satisfactory
installations.6 However, as with SHAC, one should expect problems with
installation that will not be discovered until actual installations are
attempted. Hence, development of installation standards should respond
to the demonstration rather than determine it.
In short, uch information will be gained which can provide the
basis for technically sound standards; establishing the standards before
the demonstrations occur puts the cart before the horse. In other words,
many standards should be developed in connection with demonstrations
rather than for the demonstrations.
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2. Role of Standards and Warranties in Demonstration Projects
Some way of satisfying the need for certainty of performance in the
demonstrations must nevertheless be found, and consideration of standards
and warranties is logical. What are the relative merits of adoption? In
order to obtain funds from the agency demonstrating the system, industry
must satisfy the standards and warranty requirements; firms will be
induced to produce according to the standards, whatever their wisdom, or
not participate at all.7 Attempts to change the standards later will
be resisted because of investments made to produce according to the
original standards. Furthermore, some products (and the firms which
produce them) may be excluded from the demonstration market; the HUD
standards allegedly excluded many cost-effective systems.8 Such a
result may prove disastrous to the industry's development.
An alternative would require that each demonstration have a service
contract which provides that the system is in working order at all times
and that defective or other nonworking parts will be replaced. This
permits nonstandardized products to be used in the system so that
information can be gathered concerning those products' performance. It
also avoids the problem of industry investing to meet the standards
rather than the market. This is not likely to produce an incentive for
producers to supply inferior merchandise to the demonstration efforts, as
poor workmanship will repel prospective consumers of that manufacturer's
products.
Proper planning, implementation, and monitoring of demonstrations
can make certain that all needed information is obtained while insuring
the demonstrations' success. Therefore, the service contract option is
preferred for insuring demonstration success. The existence of standards
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and warranties is unlikely to produce better actual success in the
demonstrations than a service contract; furthermore, acceleration of
standards and warranties will likely ignore the information acquired by
the demonstrations, thus resulting in inferior standards and warranties.
Use of service contracts allows development of standards and warranties
to proceed at a pace determined by the acquisition of pertinent
information since the development does not then have to be tied to the
progress of demonstrations.
C. STANDARDS, WARRANTIES, AND FINANCING CONSIDERATIONS
Standards and warranties play a role in the financing of solar
systems. Most of these systems have high first costs and long lifetimes,
and financing will be necessary. Their effects occur in two principal
cases: systems bought using wholly private financing, and those which
take advantage of various state and federal incentives.
1. Standards, Warranties, and Private Financing
The availability of private financing for solar systems is in part
affected by the information available concerning those systems. For the
lending institution, this information becomes available as experience
with the new technology increases. With an increase in experience, the
lending institution's ability to assess the value of the system as
collateral increases, thus increasing their certainty and hence their
willingness to finance photovoltaic systems.
Standards and warranties are not the equivalent of experience.
Nevertheless, they may improve the collateral value of solar systems
somewhat and convey some of the necessary information to the lending
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institutions. To the extent that they represent a synthesis of operating
experience with solar systems, they reflect a certain stage of maturity
of the technology. Activities which lead to the production of the
information necessary for development of standards and warranties help
new energy technologies reach technological maturity. However, the
existence of standards and warranties not supported by adequate technical
data will not, in the long run, increase the availability of financing
because actual operating experience and not the mere existence of
standards and warranties becomes the dominant factor. Undue acceleration
of standards and warranties development will therefore not do the job.
The duration of warranty coverage may also affect the collateral
value of solar systems. As warranty length increases, so does the
collateral value and hence the availability of capital. But the
warranties must be backed by a producer likely to be around when the
trouble arrives. While subsidiaries of established firms might not be
hindered, a new firm may find difficulty in financing its warranty
requirements. Federal guarantees of warranties of small firms may help
to relieve this situation.
2. Standards, Warranties, and Public Financing
Many state and federal incentives for the development of solar
technologies are conditioned upon the solar system meeting specified
standards and warranty requirements. Two concerns arise from this use of
standards and warranties: the diversity of the requirements and the
potential impact upon technological change.
Since the requirements of the various governmental bodies are not
uniform, manufacturers of photovoltaic systems and components face a
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diverse set of requirements which they must satisfy if their products are
to compete effectively against other qualifying systems and components.
The cost of meeting these diverse requirements may be substantial, and
uniformity is desired. However, attempts to legislate standard
requirements for all states may not prove fruitful. Federal leadership
in the field, with clear indications of the appropriate stage of
development of standards and warranties for the various solar
technologies, may prove more successful in achieving uniformity.
Also, the existence of rigid standards and warranty requirements for
solar incentives is potentially harmful to technological development.
The dangers discussed above of interfering with the process of
technological change come into play. Again, federal leadership, coupled
with an information dissemination program which informs the pertinent
governmental bodies of the appropriate stage of standards development for
each of the various technologies, is probably the best way to alleviate
the situation.
D. MECHANISMS FOR DEVELOPING STANDARDS AND WARRANTIES
Prior sections have indicated that, by and large, efforts to develop
standards and warranties should proceed only as the needed information
becomes available. For the present this implies limited action, with
action increasing throughout the course of the programs.
Even though the need for action on standards and warranties for most
solar systems is not pressing, analysis of the mechanisms for their
development is still useful now because it helps to determine the
eventual course of action. Also, to some extent private mechanisms are
already in operation, and the eventual course of action must recognize
this.
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This section analyzes the two principal possibilities for
implementing standards and warranties: standards and warranties
established through the voluntary consensus process, or mandatory
standards and warranties. After discussing both options, some concerns
with the voluntary consensus system are addressed, including the
regulatory environment surrounding the system.
1. Mandatory Standards and Warranties
Mandatory standards and warranties are those contained in
legislation or regulation and therefore are backed by the force of law.
They determine what the substance of the standards and warranties must
be, and how the transactions covered by the statute or regulation must be
conducted. Legal consequences follow from failure to conform to the
mandated standards and warranties.
Implicitly, mandatory standards and warranties reject the solutions
reached through private market mechanisms (including the voluntary
consensus standards system). While certain problems (discussed below) do
exist with the voluntary consensus standards system, these same problems
may well apply to mandated standards and warranties also. Furthermore,
standards and warranties developed according to legislatively mandate are
likely to be developed according to a set timetable, regardless of the
availability of the needed information.
2. The Voluntary Consensus System
Development of standards through the voluntary consensus system
usually begins with an informal determination of the need for the
standards in a particular area. After the need has been agreed upon, the
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organization supervising the standards-writing activities will announce
the existence of the committee; interested persons may participate,
usually depending upon their ability to allocate time and resources
(theirs or their employer's) to the task. Standards are drafted by the
committee and submitted for approval to the organization as a whole.
Upon acceptance by the supervising organization, the standards are
published, for use by anyone so desiring.
Warranties can also be developed using this process, as warranties
may be viewed as one attribute of the whole product. By developing them
through this process they, like the standards so developed, can become
used industrywide.
3. Some Concerns with the Voluntary Consensus System
The voluntary consensus system does not work perfectly. Concern
over the adequacy of participation by consumers in the process has
arisen, as have concerns over possibly anticompetitive consequences of
voluntary standards, particularly those arising from failure to maintain
technically updated standards.
Adequacy of consumer participation. Questions concerning both the
level and quality of consumer participation in the voluntary consensus
process have been raised. Notice to consumer groups of proposed
standards development activities has been thought to fall short at times,
and even when adequate, attendance has been discouraged by the burden to
consumer interest groups of traveling to the meetings. Also, the ability
of consumers to participate competently without the aid of technical
consultants has been raised. Since the consumer very often possesses the
best information concerning the actual conditions of operation of the
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system, failure to include the consumer can raise serious concerns about
the substantive quality of the resulting standards. (See Section III.A
above.)
To some extent the questions concerning notice and participation are
addressed by a proposed Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rule for 16 C.F.R.
Part 457 (43 F.R. 57269) covering standards and certification. The rule
requires certain notice for proposed standards development activities and
also requires that a voluntary consensus standards development body have
certain appeal procedures for those wishing to challenge a standard. If
the rule is passed, these requirements, while similar to some procedures
of some voluntary consensus standards development organizations, will
tend to alleviate concerns over adequacy of consumer participation in
standards development for solar systems.
These concerns can be further alleviated by special funding for
consumer participation and technical consultants for the consumer
representatives. Furthermore, allowing standards to develop only as the
needed information becomes available further insures that consumer
participation will be informed and reasoned.
Anticompetitive potential of voluntary standards. The
anticompetitive potential of standards has been discussed above.
Voluntary and mandatory standards have the same potential for producing
these effects; the most important concern for a developing technology is
that the standards will not be updated frequently enough to permit free
entry by competitors offering innovative products. Why this concern
should be more important for voluntary instead of mandatory standards is
not so clear. The need for updating is the same for both and, if both
processes are equally responsive to the need for updating, then similar
results are expected to follow.
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Furthermore, the proposed FTC rule prescribes grounds for
challenging standards developed through the voluntary consensus process
as being anticompetitive in certain enumerated aspects. And 788 of the
Federal Energy Administration Authorization Act of 1977, now by all
appearances applicable to the DOE, requires consultation by DOE with the
Attorney General and the Chairman of the FTC before DOE can incorporate
voluntary consensus standards into rules governing non-procurement
situations. These safeguards should be adequate to handle
anticompetitive problems arising from voluntary standards.
4. A Preference for the Voluntary Standards System
On the whole, pursuing standards development through the voluntary
standards system is preferred. The concerns raised above are not
considered significant if the FTC rule is adopted in substantially the
form proposed. More importantly, the slow and deliberate nature of the
process is likely to result in added flexibility when compared to
mandated standards; this is of special concern with a developing
technology.
E. BASIC RESEARCH CONCERNING STANDARDS AND WARRANTIES
Many questions arise concerning the extent of the impacts standards
and warranties will have upon solar markets, for the degree of impact
helps to determine whether or not to use standards and warranties or some
alternative to achieve the desired effects. One would like to know the
maximum possible impact from standards and warranties and, most important
in a planning context, what particular set of standards and warranties
will produce that impact and whether any undesirable side effects will
ensue.
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The above analysis presents a qualitative approach to these
problems. But is a quantitive approach possible and feasible? Since
practically no academic work on standards and warranties has been
undertaken, the question cannot be answered. It does seem, however, that
it is possible to treat the subjects of standards and warranties
analytically, and it is hoped that this work provides some structure for
quantitative (including empirical) work on the subjects.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to show that the effects of standards and
warranties can be systematically analyzed for use in commercialization
programs. While the analysis is qualitative, it has substantive content
and provides a framework of reference for evaluating particular standards
and warranties and efforts for their development.
The general conclusion to be drawn concerning commercialization
efforts is to allow standards and warranties to develop by the voluntary
consensus process as the technology matures and the information collected
will permit.
Though the field is understudied, it is not intractable. Given the
increasing use of standards and warranties as policy tools, it is hoped
that more academic efforts will address the subject.
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FOOTNOTES
*This work was done under contract from Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
It served as the basis for a chapter of a report to Congress required by
S10 of P.L. 95-590, the Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development,
and Demonstration Act of 1978.
In the course of the effort several people provided very helpful
comments on earlier drafts. These people are Jeffrey L. Smith, Lowell
Orren, Paul Carpenter and Andrea Mobilia of the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, and Richard Tabors and Andrew Reamer of the M.I.T. Energy
Laboratory. Ultimate responsibility, of course, rests with me.
1. The interesting case history of automotive standards is presented
in Hemenway, pp. 13 et seq.
2. Hemenway, pp. 22 et seq.
3. The economics of technological change are complex because by its
nature technological change challenges the neoclassical assumptions of
free information and static technology. Furthermore, the process of
technological change is filled with market failures; these market
failures are reviewed in Linden, Bottaro, et al.
4. These or similar stages are common to the economic literature.
See, e.g., Scherer, p. 350, and Jacoby, Linden, et al., pp. 41-44. While
the names given to the stages give broad clues as to what occurs in each
stage, a brief description follows.
During research the basic concepts for the product are developed; the
product is little more than an idea, and essentially no information about
the product is available. As the product enters the development phase,
details concerning the product's design are settled, and basic problems
concerning the product's manufacture are resolved. As introduction
occurs, the product is first marketed, and "live" information about
consumers' reactions to the product are first obtained. Also, user
experience is first gained. The diffusion stage sees widespread
marketing of the product as customer awareness spreads.
5. Learning-by-doing and discrete technological change are used to
differentiate two qualitatively different types of technological change.
In learning-by-doing product improvement occurs by small changes in the
product design or manufacturing process coupled with lower labor costs
from experience with the design; these effects result in lower product
cost. Discrete technological change, on the other hand, refers to
radical changes in the product design, changes that are "different"
enough that manufacturing processes require substantial modification and
experience gained elsewhere cannot be wholly transplanted. Simultaneous
pursuit of the two is not possible because one works with the product
design while the other rejects it. The distinction is obviously not hard
and fast, but it gives some insight into the difference between the two.
A longer discussion appears in the Appendix to Linden, Bottaro, et al.;
the source for many of the ideas is David.
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6. A summary of the problems with SHAC installations appears in
Volume II of Jet Propulsion Laboratory, pp. 8-10 to 8-11.
7. There is evidence that "[b]ecause of the stringent warranties
requirements imposed by HUD [on the SHAC demonstrations] some reputable
manufacturers had declined to participate . . ." Central Solar Energy
Research Corporation, p. 22.
8. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, p. 21.
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